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Abstract 
Because of payoff uncertainties combined with risk aversion and/or real options, 
farmers may demand a premium in order to adopt conservation tillage practices, over and 
above the compensation for the expected profit losses (if any). We propose a method of 
directly estimating the financial incentives for adopting conservation tillage and 
distinguishing between the expected payoff and premium of adoption based on observed 
behavior. We find that the premium may play a significant role in farmers’ adoption 
decisions.  
 
Keywords: adoption subsidies, Conservation Security Program (CSP), conservation 
tillage, risk premium.  
 
  
 
 
 
GREEN SUBSIDIES IN AGRICULTURE: ESTIMATING THE ADOPTION 
COSTS OF CONSERVATION TILLAGE FROM OBSERVED BEHAVIOR 
The provision of the Conservation Security Program (CSP) in the 2002 Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act (the 2002 farm bill) marks a potentially significant change in the 
direction of U.S. environmental policy with respect to agriculture. Rather than focusing on 
incentives to retire environmentally sensitive land from production, the CSP targets 
changes in agricultural practices on working lands. Specifically, the act authorizes the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture to make payments to farmers who adopt conservation practices, 
such as conservation tillage. To predict farmer participation and the cost of this program, it 
is important to estimate quantitatively farmers’ incentives to adopt such practices.  
The adoption of conservation practices does not always lead to a reduction in farm-
ers’ profits. In fact, even without any government subsidy, on average over 36 percent of 
U.S. acres are in conservation tillage (CTIC 2000). Nevertheless, to the extent that an 
individual farmer ignores the social benefits of conservation practices, the adoption rate 
is likely to be lower than socially optimal. Further, even when conservation practices can 
raise farmers’ expected profits, they may be reluctant to adopt because the practices may 
be riskier. They may require a premium to adopt if they are risk averse, because the net 
payoff under conservation tillage is often more uncertain (Klemme 1985; Fox et al. 
1991). Further, the premium may arise because adoption involves sunk investments (e.g., 
in human or physical capital) and real options are present (Arrow and Fisher 1974). Then, 
even if they are risk neutral, farmers may have incentives to wait for more information 
about the payoffs of both tillage practices before committing to investments. Under either 
or both cases, farmers adopt only if the additional profit of conservation practices over-
comes the premium. 
There is a large body of literature devoted to the incentives of farmers to adopt con-
servation practices and new technologies in general (Sunding and Zilberman 2000 
provides a review). The incentives are found to depend qualitatively on soil quality, crops 
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grown, and farmer characteristics such as age and education. In spite of this literature, 
there exists little empirical evidence on the incentive payments (or subsidies) that would 
be needed to induce farmers to adopt conservation practices (and new technologies in 
general). Thus, there is little empirical evidence for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
CSP or for considering the consequences of setting alternative subsidy levels. 
The reason for this omission is that most of the studies employ discrete choice meth-
ods that allow coefficient estimates to be recovered only up to a multiplicative constant. 
Thus, though probabilities of adoption can be estimated, these estimates cannot be readily 
converted into dollar compensation levels. Consequently, adoption subsidies have been 
estimated mostly through stated preference methods (Lohr and Park 1995; Cooper and 
Keim 1996; Cooper 1997).1  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we adopt a modeling 
strategy based on the contingent valuations literature that allows for full recovery of the 
structural coefficients and hence gives us the ability to compute directly the subsidies 
needed for adoption. Pautsch et al. (2001) apply a simple version of this model to exam-
ine the potential for carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Here, we develop a richer 
version where we incorporate an adoption premium related to uncertainty in addition to 
changes in expected profit. Second, we decompose the subsidy into two components: the 
profit loss (or gain) from adoption and the premium associated with uncertainty. In so 
doing, we confirm the arguments of agronomists and extension agents that conservation 
tillage pays (Jolly, Edwards, and Erbach 1983; Setia and Osborn 1989; Fox et al. 1991; 
Stonehouse 1995): on average in our sample, a farmer gains from adoption. However, the 
adoption premium may exceed the profit gain, and consequently the farmer may require a 
subsidy to adopt the practice. We study the significance and empirical magnitude of these 
quantities.  
Finally, based on the estimated subsidies, we calculate the “supply curve” of conser-
vation tillage and analyze the role of the subsidies in improving environmental 
performance and as a tool of income transfers to farmers. We find that a significant part 
of the subsidy (or conservation payments) will be income transfers to existing and low-
cost adopters. Thus, while a program like the CSP can be expected to yield an increase in 
the environmentally friendly practice of conservation tillage, a large percentage of the 
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funds will be transferred to producers for whom adoption has already occurred. Our 
results provide some of the first empirical evidence on the potential effectiveness of a 
program like the CSP in encouraging adoption of conservation tillage. 
 
The Adoption Model 
We begin by describing the theoretical justification for the existence of an adoption 
premium, and why the premium relates directly to payoff uncertainties, thereby allowing 
separate estimation of the premium and net returns of conservation tillage. Let 1π  repre-
sent the expected annual net return from using conservation tillage while 0π  is that from 
using conventional tillage and 21σ  and 
2
0σ  are the variances of the two returns. Consider 
first a simple case where every year farmers can freely change their farming practices 
between the two choices. If they are risk averse, standard utility theory indicates that they 
use conservation tillage if and only if 2 21 1 0 0( , ) ( , )r r r rR Rπ σ π σ− ≥ −z z  or 
2 2
1 0 1 0( , ) ( , )r r r rR Rπ π σ σ− ≥ −z z , where ( )rR i  is the risk premium associated with each 
practice, and rz  is the set of variables that affect the risk premium, such as farm income 
and other individual attributes. Typically 2 21 0σ σ> , either because farmers have more 
experience with conventional till or because of the agronomic characteristics of the two 
practices (Klemme 1985; Fox et al. 1991). Then 1π  must exceed 0π  by a strictly positive 
premium for farmers to adopt conservation tillage. 
More realistically, adopting a new tillage practice requires investment in physical 
and human capital. Moreover, conservation tillage usually leads to lower yields in early 
years before soil nutrients build up. The lost profit in these years is sunk because it 
cannot be recovered by reverting to conventional tillage. Given the uncertainties and the 
lost profits, farmers may be reluctant to adopt conservation tillage and will adopt only 
when they are especially “sure” that adoption will be profitable. Specifically, there is 
value in delaying the adoption decision until farmers have acquired enough information 
about the practice to be sure that the likelihood of unprofitable adoption is sufficiently 
low. In this case, farmers adopt only when 1π  exceeds 0π  by the option value or pre-
mium, 2 21 0( , , )p pR σ σ z , where ( )pR i  is increasing in the first two arguments, and pz  is 
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the relevant explanatory variable. This reasoning does not depend on the risk attitude of 
farmers and is a standard result in the real options literature (Arrow and Fisher 1974; 
Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  
Note that both sources of the adoption premium ( rR  and pR ) depend on the exis-
tence of uncertainties in the returns of conventional and conservation tillage practices, as 
well as on income and farmer characteristics. For example, the existence of sunk costs of 
adoption alone does not generate a premium. If farmers know with certainty the future 
streams of returns under the two practices, their decision will depend only on the two net 
present values. In this case, the sunk costs simply enter the streams of returns and affect 
the NPVs alone, and thus they will not lead to any additional adoption premium. 
In summary, because of risk aversion or real options, farmers typically demand a 
premium for adopting conservation tillage. That is, they adopt if and only if 
2 2
1 0 1 0( , , )Pπ π σ σ− ≥ z , where 2 2 2 2 2 21 0 1 0 1 0( , , ) [ ( , ) ( , )] ( , , )r r r r p pP R R Rσ σ σ σ σ σ≡ − +z z z z . 
The premium is zero when both variances are zero. This latter fact is the critical feature 
that allows estimation of the premium to be separate from that of the net returns of 
conservation tillage. 
We turn now to the modeling strategy for describing farmers’ decisions to adopt con-
servation tillage. In the standard setting, farmers are expected to adopt conservation 
tillage if the anticipated profit from adoption exceeds that from continuing with conven-
tional practices, that is, when 1 0π π≥ . The farmers’ profit functions are assumed known 
to the farmers but unobservable to the researcher. An additive error is incorporated to 
reflect the researcher’s omission of relevant variables or misspecification of the net 
returns functions. An expression for the probability of adoption from the researcher’s 
perspective can be then written as 
 [ ] [ ]1 0Pr Pr ,adopt π π σε= ≥ +  (1) 
where ε  is typically a standard normal or logistic error and σ  is the associated standard 
deviation multiplier. We write the error term in this somewhat nonstandard way to 
explain more easily the limitation of this form of the model. The next step is to specify a 
functional form for the difference in the net returns, typically linear in explanatory 
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variables; for example, 1 0π π− =  , where y is a vector of explanatory variables and is 
a vector of coefficients. 
Two limitations in this model restricts the full understanding of adoption decisions. 
First, there is no explicit formalization of the existence of the premium needed to induce 
adoption. Second, and even more critical for estimating the financial incentives needed to 
induce adoption, the coefficients on the net returns expression can only be estimated up 
to the multiplicative constant, σ . To see this, write the probability of adoption as  
 
[ ] [ ]1 0Pr Pr
Pr[ ]
Pr[ ].
adopt π π σε
σε
ε
σ
= ≥ +
= ≥
= ≤


 (2) 
This formulation makes clear the point that is well known among practitioners of 
discrete choice models: only estimates of the ratios of the coefficients to the standard 
deviation can be recovered. Consequently, the changes in net returns associated with 
adoption of conservation tillage cannot be estimated. Analysts must be satisfied with 
predictions of qualitative changes such as identifying what characteristics of farmers will 
increase the likelihood of adoption.  
Here we propose and implement a conceptual model that both (a) explicitly incorpo-
rates an adoption premium to reflect risk aversion and real options, and (b) allows 
recovery of an estimate of σ , thereby allowing recovery of the individual parameter 
values. Specifically, we assume that an individual farmer will adopt conservation tillage 
when 1 0 ,Pπ π≥ +  where P is the premium. Again, an additive error is used to represent 
omitted variables or misrepresentation of the net returns statement by the researcher, and 
1π  is assumed linear in explanatory variables. However, we assume that the expected net 
returns from conventional tillage are known to the farmer and focus on modeling the 
returns to conservation tillage as a function of explanatory variables. Thus, we write the 
probability of adoption as 
6 / Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
 
[ ] [ ]1 0
0
2 2
0 1 2
Pr Pr
Pr[ ]
( , , )Pr[ ],
adopt P
P
P
π π σε
π σε
π σ σ
ε
σ σ σ
= ≥ + +
= ≥ + +
= ≤ − −

 
 (3) 
where 2 21 2( , , )P σ σ z  represents the premium as a function of its explanatory variables, and 
the bar on 0π  denotes that this variable is known. Note that   represents the expected 
net returns to conservation tillage, and not the difference in returns between the two 
practices (represented by   above). 
In this formulation, recovery of the standard deviation multiplier σ  is straightfor-
ward, as it will be simply the inverse of the coefficient estimated on 0π . Thus, by adding 
information to the model in the form of the expected net profits from conventional tillage, 
it is possible to estimate the standard error, in turn allowing recovery of the specific 
parameter values for .2  
Further, it seems reasonable to assume that farmers understand well the expected  
return from adoption of conventional tillage, as this practice has been used widely over a 
long period. Thus, farmers have substantial experience both in using conventional tillage 
and in predicting its mean profitability (e.g., in making annual planting decisions).  
Turning now to the premium function, note that the theoretical basis for the presence 
of an adoption premium requires the presence of profit uncertainties of the two tillage 
practices. Although these uncertainties may affect the premium differently under risk 
aversion and real options, we focus on the magnitude of the premium and how it depends 
on the uncertainties rather than focusing on attempting to identify the source. Since the 
data set we use is cross-sectional and because of well-established agricultural input and 
output markets, we see no reason for the farmers in our sample to face varying price 
uncertainty across the two practices. Thus, only yield uncertainties vary across the sample 
and are modeled in this study. This observation provides important guidance in specify-
ing the empirical model, as it implies that the adoption premiums should depend on 
variables related to yield uncertainty as well as to farmer characteristics that may define 
how uncertainty translates into adoption premiums. Because the expected net return 1π  
does not depend on the uncertainties, 21σ  and 22σ  do not enter the explanatory variables x. 
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Again, the connection of the premium to uncertainty in returns provides the theoretical 
foundation for separating the premium from net returns in the estimation model. 
 
Data and Notation 
The study region is the state of Iowa. Summary statistics and definitions of the  
explanatory variables are given in Table 1. All data are for the 1992 growing season.3 
The crops in the analysis are corn, soybeans, wheat, and hay.  
The primary data source is a random sample drawn from the National Resource  
Inventory (NRI) (USDA/NRCS 1994). The NRI provides information on the natural 
resource characteristics of the land (soil properties and slope), the crop grown (1992 and 
1991 seasons), and the farming practices used by the producer. The data are statistically 
reliable for national, state, and multi-county analysis of non-federal land (Nusser and 
Goebel 1997). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Iowa NRI sample is representative 
of Iowa agricultural land. For the purposes of our estimation, we treat each NRI point as 
representing a producer.  
NRI also provides information on whether conservation tillage is used. The tillage is 
defined as conservation if at least 30 percent of the soil surface is covered by plant 
residue after planting or at least 1,000 pounds per acre of flat, small-grain residue equiva-
lent are on the surface during the critical erosion period (USDA/NRCS 1994). Because an 
increase in the amount of crop residue cover on the soil surface tends to keep soils cooler, 
wetter, less aerated, and denser, conservation tillage is favored on sloping and better-
drained soils (e.g., Allmaras and Dowdy 1985). As seen from Table 1, 63 percent of Iowa 
cropland is worked using conservation tillage.  
To form our complete data set, we supplement the NRI data with constructed net  
returns to conventional tillage, climate, and farm operator characteristics data. We 
constructed 0π  of each NRI sample point through farm budget analysis, specifically by 
combining county-specific average yield data during the 1991–92 period (USDA/NASS 
1994), state-specific price data in 1992 (USDA/NASS 1999a), and region-, tillage-, and 
rotation-specific cost data from Mitchell (1997). As shown in Table 1, when calculating 
0π , we grouped together the crops other than corn and soybeans to account for the 
somewhat idiosyncratic nature of these crop choices (over 90 percent of Iowa cropland is  
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TABLE 1. Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Notation Description Units 
Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
St. Dev. 
 Conservation tillage (1-yes, 0-no) Number 0.63 0.48 
cnI  Corn (1-corn, 0-soybeans or other crop) Number 0.57 0.50 
0,cnπ  
Net returns to conventional tillage, corna $ per acre 145 23 
0,sbπ  
Net returns to conventional tillage, 
soybeansb 
$ per acre 109 14 
0,othπ  
Net returns to conventional tillage, other 
crops c,d 
$ per acre 93 43 
SLOPE Land slope Percent 4.1 3.9 
PM Soil permeability Inches per 
Hour 
1.7 2.2 
AWC Soil available water capacity Percent 18.5 2.8 
TMAX Mean of daily maximum temperature 
during the corn growing season 
Fahrenheit 78.7 1.8 
TMIN Mean of daily minimum temperature 
during the growing season 
Fahrenheit 55.6 2.0 
PRECIP Mean of daily precipitation during the 
growing season 
Inches 0.141 0.012 
precipσ  Standard deviation of daily precipitation 
during the growing season 
Inches 0.331 0.027 
OFFFARM Proportion of operators working off-farm 
to the total number of farm operators 
in the county 
Number 0.471 0.055 
TENANT Proportion of harvested cropland oper-
ated by tenants to the total county 
harvested cropland 
Number 0.199 0.050 
AGE County average farm operator age Years 50.2 1.8 
MALE Proportion of male operators to the total 
number of farm operators in the 
county 
Number 0.9774 0.0096 
FARMSIZE County average farm size Acres 330 61 
Note: Total observations are 1,339. 
a
 762 observations. 
b
 475 observations. 
c
 Wheat or hay. 
d
 102 observations. 
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planted in corn or soybeans). The variable jI is an indicator function for crops—j = cn 
(corn), sb (soybeans), oth (other)—with jI = 1 if crop j is grown and jI  = 0 otherwise.  
To put together climatic data for the crop growing seasons (as reported in 
USDA/NASS 1997), we assigned each NRI point to a weather station based on the 
county of location, and used 1975–94 weather station data provided by the National 
Climatic Data Center (Earthinfo 1995) to construct temperature and precipitation data 
(TMAX, TMIN, PRECIP, and precipσ ). The intertemporal standard deviation of precipita-
tion precipσ  was calculated as the standard deviation of the daily precipitation during the 
growing season over the years 1975–94. Thus, it captures both the within-season and 
cross-season variations. County average indicators of farm operator characteristics 
(OFFFARM, TENANT, AGE, MALE, and FARMSIZE) were constructed from the 1992 
Census of Agriculture data (USDA/NASS 1999b). 
 
Model Specification and Estimation Results 
The estimation models are variations of the following basic specification of the 
probability of adopting conservation tillage: 
 [ ] 1, 0,Pr Pr , , , ,j j jadopt P j cn sb othπ π = ≥ + =   (4) 
where 
1, 0, 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
1, 2, 0,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
,
and
(
j cn cn
j precip j j j
j j j j j
I SLOPE PM AWC TMAX TMIN PRECIP
TENANT OFFFARM AGE MALE FARMSIZE
P
OFFFARM TENANT AGE MALE FARM
ε
π β β β β β β β
β β β β β
σ ε
σ α α π
α α α α α
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅
= + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ).SIZE
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The random variable ε  is assumed to be logistically distributed. The parameters to 
be estimated are the β ’s, the α ’s, and εσ . In keeping with previous studies on conser-
vation tillage adoption, we included a number of farm operator and farm characteristics 
(OFFFARM, TENANT, AGE, MALE, and FARMSIZE) that affect adoption decisions, 
according to the hypotheses in the literature (Sunding and Zilberman 2000).4 Notice that 
these characteristics may affect both the expected payoff of conservation tillage and the 
adoption premium. 
Unfortunately, there is high collinearity in the county-level data on farmer character-
istics. The presence of the problem can be seen from at least two indicators: high standard 
errors of coefficients when all variables in question are included in the model, and 
moment matrix condition numbers, which are 78.85 for the (OFFFARM, TENANT, AGE, 
MALE) group, and 104.75 for the (OFFFARM, TENANT, AGE, MALE, and FARMSIZE) 
group.5  
Table 2 contains the estimation results for several variations of the basic model in 
equation (4). Because there is a high degree of correlation between FARMSIZE and the 
other variables, we begin by comparing three models that do not include FARMSIZE. 
These are (i) the unrestricted Model 1 where the explanatory variables OFFFARM, AGE, 
and MALE appear in both the net returns (the β ’s) and in the premium (the α ’s,); (ii) 
the restricted Model 1 in which the explanatory variables OFFFARM, AGE, and MALE 
appear in the net returns only (not reported); and (iii) the restricted Model 2 in which the 
explanatory variables OFFFARM, AGE, and MALE appear in the premium only. Using a 
generalized likelihood ratio test, we reject the restricted Model 1 in favor of the unre-
stricted Model 1 (the computed test statistic 28.2 is greater than the critical value of 16.92 
at the 5 percent level of significance), and we fail to reject Model 2 in favor of Model 1 
(the computed test statistic 1.13 is clearly less than the critical values at any conventional 
level of significance). Models 3 and 4 correspond to Models 1 and 2 respectively, with 
FARMSIZE added as an explanatory variable. Further, we fail to reject Model 4 against 
the unrestricted Model 3 with a test statistic value of 6.00, again less than the critical 
values at any conventional level of significance. Overall, Model 4 provides a better fit 
than does Model 2, as the corresponding generalized likelihood ratio tests reject Model 2 
but not Model 4 in favor of the most general model, Model 3.  
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TABLE 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of the adoption model 
Variable(s) Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Net returns to conservation tillage 
cnI  0,cnβ  40* 41* 30* 32* 
  (10) (11) (13) (11)  
SLOPE 1β  0.20*** 0.22*** 0.17 0.13 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) 
PM 2β  0.59** 0.63** 0.60*** 0.50*** 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.37) (0.28) 
AWC 3β  0.68** 0.73** 0.71** 0.60** 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.36) (0.25) 
TMAX 4β  2.30* 2.57* 2.8** 2.47* 
  (0.76) (0.68) (1.2) (0.63) 
TMIN 5β  -2.25* -2.48* -2.9** -2.46* 
  (0.75) (0.72) (1.2) (0.68) 
PRECIP 6β  63 76 105 118*** 
  (67) (69) (88) (71)  
TENANT 
7β  143 194** 27 217** 
  (116) (92) (168) (87) 
OFFFARM 8β  -103 _ 42 _ 
  (115)  (166)  
AGE 9β  -0.1 _ -4.3 _ 
  (3.2)  (4.5)  
MALE 10β  75 _ 172 _ 
  (170)  (195)  
FARMSIZE 11β  _ _ 0.20 _ 
    (0.18)  
Error Term 
εσ  5.6
*
 6.0* 6.5* 5.9* 
  (1.7) (1.6) (2.5) (1.5) 
Premium      
precip cnIσ ⋅  1,cnα  1271
*
 1400* 1508** 1416* 
  (442) (411) (629) (407) 
precip sbIσ ⋅  1,sbα  1017
**
 1123* 1222** 1162* 
  (450) (432) (609) (428) 
precip othIσ ⋅  1,othα  719 770 681 551 
  (536) (557) (641) (521) 
0,precip cnσ π⋅  2,cnα  -2.79
*
 -2.79* -2.72* -2.77* 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) 
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Table 2. Continued      
Variable(s) Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
0,precip sbσ π⋅  2,sbα  -3.30
*
 -3.32* -3.26* -3.21* 
  (0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.19) 
0,precip othσ π⋅  2,othα  -3.01
*
 -3.00* -3.03* -2.99* 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) 
precip cnTENANT Iσ ⋅ ⋅  3,cnα  434 607
**
 -17 582** 
  (356) (274) (530) (271) 
precip sbTENANT Iσ ⋅ ⋅  3,sbα  518 682
*
 143 701* 
  (350) (264) (501) (262) 
precip othTENANT Iσ ⋅ ⋅  3,othα  288 442 -66 506 
  (389) (339) (572) (322) 
precip cnOFFFARM Iσ ⋅ ⋅  4,cnα  -412 -103
**
 101 _ 
  (357) (47) (509)  
precip sbOFFFARM Iσ ⋅ ⋅  4,sbα  -429 -131
*
 41 _ 
  (355) (59) (494)  
precip othOFFFARM Iσ ⋅ ⋅  4,othα  -367 -53 32 _ 
  (371) (94) (533)  
precip cnAGE Iσ ⋅ ⋅  5,cnα  -5.2 -5.1
*
 -22 -8.2* 
  (9.1) (1.8) (15) (2.4) 
precip sbAGE Iσ ⋅ ⋅  5,sbα  -4.3 -4.0
**
 -19 -6.3* 
  (9.1) (2.0) (14) (2.3) 
precip othAGE Iσ ⋅ ⋅  5,othα  -3.3 -2.9 -15 -2.6 
  (9.9) (4.1) (15) (4.1) 
precip cnMALE Iσ ⋅ ⋅  6,cnα  -456 -763
**
 -284 -759** 
  (707) (302) (801) (298) 
precip sbMALE Iσ ⋅ ⋅  6,sbα  -314 -605
***
 -135 -647*** 
  (710) (338) (808) (334) 
precip othMALE Iσ ⋅ ⋅  6,othα  -52 -301 290 -130 
  (741) (469) (849) (441) 
precip cnFARMSIZE Iσ ⋅ ⋅   _ _ 0.79 0.183
*
 
    (0.60) (0.059) 
precip sbFARMSIZE Iσ ⋅ ⋅   _ _ 0.68 0.128
**
 
    (0.56) (0.053) 
precip othFARMSIZE Iσ ⋅ ⋅   _ _ 0.55 -0.007 
    (0.55) (0.080) 
Fraction of correct 
di i
 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.73 
Log (likelihood)  -778.7 -779.3 -766.5 -769.5 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; they are computed from analytic second derivatives. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Green Subsidies in Agriculture / 13 
Estimates of the effect of soil and climatic conditions on the net returns to conserva-
tion tillage are similar among the four models reported and appear reasonable. Land slope 
(the amount of inclination of the soil surface from the horizontal expressed as the vertical 
distance divided by the horizontal distance), soil permeability (the rate at which water can 
pass through a soil material), and available water capacity (the amount of water that a soil 
can store in a form available for plant use) are all positively related to better drainage of 
the soil. Improved soil drainage, in turn, is found to positively affect yields under conser-
vation tillage systems (see, for example, Allmaras and Dowdy 1985). The effect of 
climatic variables on conservation tillage adoption is also robust to the inclusion or 
exclusion of farm and farmer characteristics and likewise consistent with agronomic 
science. The signs of the two temperature variables indicate that net returns are higher 
when the daily temperature variation is higher. The positive effect of precipitation is 
consistent, with rainfall generally acting as a limiting factor of crop production.6 
Agronomic studies indicate that a major variable that affects yield uncertainties  
under both conservation and conventional tillage is the variability of climatic conditions 
during a crop’s growing season (Kaufmann and Snell 1997; Hansen 1991). In this study, 
we model the climatic variability by way of the variability of precipitation. While the 
variability of temperature is also important, it often affects the yield variability in con-
junction with precipitation variability (Runge 1968). Also, in our study region, areas with 
higher precipitation variability tend to have higher temperature variability during the 
crucial periods of the growing season; the sample correlation coefficients between 
precipitation variability and measures of temperature variability are as high as 0.25. Thus, 
only the precipitation variability is included in the premium estimation.  
The functional form assumed in (4) for the adoption premium guarantees that there is 
zero premium without the weather variability, as theoretically required. Note that with the 
inclusion of precipσ , premium jP  is identified separately from profit 1, jπ , thus separating 
the effects of those social economic variables that affect both jP  and 1, jπ . While the 
county-level data available for this study is too aggregated in nature to make strong 
conclusions about the relationships between the social economic variables and adoption 
behavior, a few relationships are worth noting. 
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Farmer’s age is found to negatively affect the adoption premium and thus to posi-
tively affect the adoption of conservation tillage. Off-farm employment is found to reduce 
the adoption premium, thereby increasing the adoption rate. Since those working off-farm 
have more diversified sources of income, they may be less risk averse and demand a 
smaller premium for adoption. Our estimates suggest a negative effect of the proportion 
of males on the adoption premium.  
We find that tenancy increases the expected net returns to conservation tillage but 
also raises the adoption premium. Its overall effect on adoption is negligible, as these two 
effects roughly cancel each other out. The returns to conventional tillage was used as a 
proxy to farmer’s income in the analysis of the premium. The estimated strong negative 
effect of this variable on the premium is consistent with the presumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion that has found support in many studies of farmers’ behavior (see, 
for example, Moschini and Hennessy 2000). However, similar to the effect of tenancy, 
the overall effect of this variable on the probability of adoption is about zero at the data 
means.7 We find a positive effect of farm size on the adoption premium, and thus a 
negative effect on the probability of adoption.  
 
Adoption Premiums, Subsidies, and Policy Implications 
Table 3 presents the estimated adoption payoffs and premiums for the entire sample. The 
premium accounts for about 13 percent of the annual expected returns to conventional 
tillage for both major crops. This represents the amount that farmers would need to be 
paid to compensate them for the uncertainty associated with conservation tillage. If the 
net return to conservation tillage is greater than the premium, a farmer will adopt with no 
subsidy. If, however, the net returns are negative, or less than the premium, a subsidy will 
be required for adoption. 
Based on the estimated results, we calculate the subsidies that are needed to induce 
farmers to adopt conservation tillage. Specifically, given the farmer, soil, and weather 
characteristics, we calculate the expected net return from conservation tillage, 1πˆ , and the 
required adoption premium, ˆP . Let S be the minimum subsidy required for farmers to 
adopt conservation tillage. If a farmer has already adopted conservation tillage, the  
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TABLE 3. Estimated Per Acre Adoption Payoff and Premium: Full Sample 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Corn     
Premium, ˆP  ($) 18 (12) 
22 
(12)  
11 
(14) 
13 
(11) 
Expected net returns to conservation 
tillage, 1πˆ  ($) 
167 
(13) 
 
171 
(13) 
161 
(15) 
163 
(12) 
Percentage of the premium in the 
expected net returns to conven-
tional tillage, 0ˆ /P π  (%) 
12.5 
(8.5)  
14.9 
(8.5) 
7.4 
(9.4) 
9.3 
(7.8) 
Soybeans     
Premium, ˆP  ($) 14 (12)  
16 
(12) 
16 
(15) 
18 
(13) 
Expected net returns to conservation 
tillage, 1πˆ  ($) 
127 
(10) 
 
130 
(13) 
131 
(16) 
132 
(13) 
Percentage of the premium in the 
expected net returns to conven-
tional tillage, 0ˆ /P π  (%) 
12 
(11)  
15 
(11) 
15 
(14) 
16 
(12) 
Other Crops     
Premium, ˆP  ($) 27 (14) 
30 
(14) 
29 
(18) 
29 
(14) 
Expected net returns to conservation 
tillage, 1πˆ  ($) 
118 
(13) 
 
120 
(14) 
118 
(16) 
119 
(14) 
Percentage of the premium in the 
expected net returns to conven-
tional tillage, 0ˆ /P π  (%) 
30 
(15)  
32 
(16)  
31 
(19) 
31 
(15) 
Note: Estimates are reported at the means of the corresponding samples; standard errors are in parentheses. 
The standard errors are computed using the Delta method under the assumption of asymptotic normality. 
We used the subroutine ANALYZE of TSP to compute the standard errors. 
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required subsidy is zero. Otherwise, the minimum subsidy must satisfy 1 0 ˆˆ S Pπ π+ = + . 
Then we know 
 ( ){ }0 1ˆ ˆmax ,0 .S P π π= + −  (5) 
When S is positive, it can be decomposed into two parts. One part (equal to ˆP ) is 
used to remove the “hesitancy” of farmers by compensating for their adoption premium, 
and the remaining part is the monetary transfer to compensate for the profit loss.  
Table 4 presents estimates of the premium and mean subsidy evaluated at the sample 
mean for the subsample of farmers who have not adopted conservation tillage and 
therefore whose adoption is not expected without a government subsidy. On average, 
consistent with the extensive agronomic studies, the expected profit of conservation 
tillage is higher than that of conventional tillage. For example, in Model 4, the projected 
profit gain of conservation tillage is $4 per acre for corn and $38 per acre for soybeans.8 
In the case of such profit gains, why would a farmer not adopt conservation tillage? The 
answer lies with the adoption premium. The premium is $7 per acre for corn and $40 for 
soybeans, both being higher than the profit gain from conservation tillage. Therefore, 
either because of risk aversion or real options, the farmer stayed with conventional 
tillage. That is, the potential gain was not high enough to offset the presence of risk 
aversion and/or real options. 
To induce adoption, the subsidy, which equals the difference between the profit gain 
and the adoption premium (equation [5]), is $2.47 per acre per year for corn and $2.70 for 
soybeans. Our estimate of the required subsidy is much lower than that estimated by 
Cooper (1997) (about $23). Our lower estimates seem reasonable in our study application 
given that, without any subsidies, about 64 percent of Iowa crop land under corn and 68 
percent of that under soybeans is already worked using conservation tillage. Likewise, the 
subsidy estimates reported here are lower than those reported in Pautsch et al. (2001) 
because of our more accurate inclusion of a premium and better econometric fit. 
Applying equation (5) to each sample point, we calculate the required minimum 
adoption subsidies for the entire sample. Scaling up the area represented by the sample to 
the total Iowa agricultural land area, we obtain the state’s intensity of adoption at each 
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TABLE 4. Estimated per acre adoption premium and subsidy: current non-adopters 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Corn     
Profit loss due to adoption, 0 1ˆπ π−  ($) -9 (13) 
-11 
(12) 
-9 
(16) 
-4 
(12) 
Premium, ˆP  ($) 11 (13) 
 
13 
(13) 
 
10 
(17) 
 
7 
(12) 
Subsidy needed for adoption, 
( )0 1ˆ ˆ ˆS P π π= + −  ($) 
2.03 
(0.88)  
2.35 
(0.93)  
2.7 
(1.3)  
2.47 
(0.94) 
Soybeans     
Profit loss due to adoption, 0 1ˆπ π−  ($) -35 (15)  
-35 
(13)  
-43 
(21)  
-38 
(14) 
Premium, ˆP  ($) 38 (15) 
 
38 
(14) 
 
47 
(22) 
 
40 
(14) 
Subsidy needed for adoption, 
( )0 1ˆ ˆ ˆS P π π= + −  ($) 
3.2 
(1.3)  
3.5 
(1.3)  
3.7 
(1.7)  
2.7 
(1.2) 
Other Crops     
Profit loss due to adoption, 0 1ˆπ π−  ($) -21 (14) 
-22 
(14) 
-23 
(16) 
-24 
(14) 
Premium, ˆP  ($) 26 (15) 
 
27 
(15) 
 
28 
(18) 
 
28 
(15) 
Subsidy needed for adoption, 
( )0 1ˆ ˆ ˆS P π π= + −  ($) 
4.5 
(2.2)  
4.9 
(2.2)  
5.0 
(2.8)  
4.1 
(2.0) 
Note: Estimates are reported at the means of the corresponding samples; standard errors in parenthesis. We 
used the subroutine ANALYZE of TSP to compute the standard errors. 
 
subsidy level, or the “supply curve” of conservation tillage, which is presented in Figure 
1.9 Over 14 million acres (about 63 percent of all agricultural land) in Iowa are already in 
conservation tillage without any subsidy. The acreage increases as the subsidy level rises.  
At a subsidy of $11.5 per acre, about 90 percent of farmland would be in conservation 
tillage. Note that the use of the econometrically estimated model allows estimation of the 
confidence bounds on the supply curve and the subsidy needed to achieve any given level 
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FIGURE 1. Conservation tillage supply curve and the subsidy needed to achieve 90 
percent adoption with 95 percent confidence bounds 
 
of adoption. The confidence bounds in Figure 1 are obtained from 10,000 random draws 
using the methodology of Krinski and Robb (1986). 
The supply curve allows us to analyze the nature of a conservation tillage subsidy, in 
particular, its role as a tool for environmental efficiency or for income transfer. Suppose 
the government decides to subsidize conservation tillage at $11.5 per acre, for new and 
existing adopters alike.10 The subsidy acts as a pure income transfer for existing adopters, 
as they do not need any additional incentive to adopt. Even for the new adopters, part of 
the subsidy is, in fact, an income transfer (similar to producer surplus) because of the 
heterogeneity of the adoption costs. Only the area under the supply curve captures the 
required compensation for conservation tillage, or serves the single purpose of generating 
environmental benefits from conservation tillage. 
From Figure 2, it is obvious that the income transfer portion of the subsidy far  
exceeds the efficiency payment component. Of the $237 million total subsidy needed to 
achieve 90 percent adoption, about $205 million, or over 86 percent, of the total subsidies  
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FIGURE 2. Total predicted subsidy cost to achieve 90 percent conservation tillage 
adoption in Iowa  
 
represents income transfers, a major part of which goes to existing adopters. Using the 
approach of Krinsky and Robb (1986), the 95 percent confidence interval for the total 
subsidy is estimated to be [$135 million, $371 million], and that for the income transfers 
is [$117 million, $320 million]. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a method of directly estimating the financial incentives for 
adopting conservation tillage and distinguishing between the expected payoff and the 
premium of adoption based on observed behavior. We find that the adoption premium  
may play a significant role in farmers’ adoption decisions. Some non-adopters choose not 
to use conservation tillage because the expected profit gain alone does not fully compen-
sate them for the increased risk and possibility of irreversible lost profits associated with 
changing from conventional tillage practices. To induce adoption, government subsidies 
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could be used to overcome the adoption premium net of the expected gain from adoption. 
We find that on average, the mean annual subsidy needed is $2.4 per acre for corn and 
$3.3 per acre for soybeans. 
Information on estimating the adoption subsidy should be helpful to policymakers 
interested in designing subsidy programs for environmentally friendly agricultural 
practices. Given appropriate data, the model developed here can be applied to a wide 
variety of environmentally friendly practices such as drip irrigating, terracing, and using 
buffer strips.  
In this paper, we do not distinguish between the risk aversion and real options forces 
underlying the adoption premium. However, the distinction is important for policy design 
because the two possibilities may suggest different optimal policy responses. For example, 
if risk aversion generates the bulk of the premium, a proper government response may be to 
offer stabilization policies such as green insurance. However, if irreversibility of sunk 
investments primarily generates the premium, measures to reduce the option value are more 
efficient, such as providing better information about conservation tillage or reducing the 
sunk cost of adoption (e.g., by subsidizing conservation tillage in early years). 
Another distinction not explicitly addressed in this model is the use of continuous 
conservation tillage versus the adoption of conservation tillage for a single year. For 
some environmental amenities, notably carbon sequestration, a break in the use of 
conservation till will dissipate most of the accumulated benefits. Consequently, it seems 
reasonable to enact lower compensation for farmers willing to commit to a single year of 
conservation tillage and higher compensation for those willing to commit to a longer 
term. An explicitly dynamic model would be needed to examine this issue. 
  
Endnotes 
1.  As an exception, Caswell and Zilberman (1986) estimate the premium for adopting 
new irrigation technologies by relating the costs of technologies to well depth and 
electricity rates. 
2.  Readers familiar with the contingent valuation literature will immediately see the 
similarity between this model and the Cameron bid function approach commonly 
used to estimate the willingness to pay for an environmental quality change from 
discrete choice data (Cameron 1988). In the contingent valuation models, the bid  
 offered to respondents in the survey varies across respondents in the same way that 
the expected net returns from conventional tillage will vary across a sample of farm-
ers. It is this variability that allows identification of the variance of the error in both 
types of application.  
3.  Unfortunately, the 1997 and later NRIs did not collect information on tillage prac-
tices; hence, more recent NRI data are not available for model estimation. 
4.  We do not have data on farmers’ education, a factor sometimes considered as 
affecting the adoption decisions. The AGE variable turned out to be highly correlated 
(coefficient of correlation 0.67 with a p-value of less than 0.0001) with PRESENCE, 
the average years present on the farm, another variable available in the Census of 
Agriculture. The model estimated with the PRESENCE variable is neither quantita-
tively nor qualitatively different from the mode with AGE and therefore is not 
presented here. 
5.  Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) argue that values above 20 suggest potential 
problems. 
6.  Several other alternative model specifications were considered but were found to 
provide inferior fits. Specifically, the intercept term, 0β , was initially allowed to 
vary for every crop, but the estimates were not significant for soybeans and for other 
crops. We also initially modeled the error term as heteroskedastic across crops, but 
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the generalized likelihood ratio test failed to reject the hypothesis that the error term 
is homoskedastic. The computed test statistics, 3.72 for Model 2 and 2.44 for Model 
4, do not exceed the critical value of 5.99 at the 5 percent level of significance. 
7.  The derivative of the probability of adoption with respect to 0π  is proportional to 
2, 2, 2,1 ( )precip cn cn sb sb oth othI I I+ σ ⋅ α ⋅ + α ⋅ + α ⋅ . 
8.  Of course, there are farmers for whom the expected net returns are lower under 
conservation tillage. They will not adopt even if their adoption premiums are zero.  
9.  Figure 1 is constructed using Model 4 results. Other models reported provide essen-
tially the same results. 
10.  The government may choose to subsidize new adopters only, but the feasibility of 
such a policy is questionable, as some have argued that it punishes “good stewards” 
of farmland.  
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